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Agricultural Production Contracts to Reduce Nitrate Leaching: A Whole-Farm Analysis
Ten alternative seed corn contract specifications are evaluated with respect to nitrate
leaching and profitability for the processor firm (principal) and contracted grower (agent).  A
whole-farm optimization and feasibility analysis suggest that contract terms can be used to reduce
non-point source pollution.Agricultural Production Contracts to Reduce Nitrate Leaching: A Whole-Farm Analysis
The growth of contracted agricultural production in the United States is well recognized
(Drabenstott, 1994).  These trends are most evident in poultry, hogs, vegetables, fruits and some grains,
such as seed corn.  Contracts can specify product quality aspects, production practices, delivery dates and
quantities, as well as prices.  Because of these contract attributes, and because there tend to be many more
contracted producers than contractors, it is possible that contracts could serve as vehicles to obtain higher
environmental quality.  In response to regulatory mandates, contracts could potentially specify the use of
environmentally protecting practices or performance outcomes.  However, a more voluntary approach to
obtaining environmental protection using contracts requires additional analysis as to the magnitude and
incidence of the opportunity costs of such contract redesign.
This paper explores the use of contract redesign to reduce non-point source pollution (NPSP) --
specifically, nitrate leaching -- by examining a case study of seed corn contracts in southwestern Michigan. 
The objective of the paper is to examine seed corn contract specifications which would induce a
representative profit-maximizing contracted grower to reduce voluntarily the nitrate leaching from seed
corn production.  Seed corn production is a useful case because price premiums are paid to encourage
contracted growers to produce high yields, and one way to do this is to fertilize heavily, which can lead to
excess nitrogen leaching or runoff.
Alternative contract designs in a principal-agent model
Chu et al. (1995) have shown that a principal-agent framework can be adapted to contracts between
an agricultural processor (the principal) and a contracted grower (the agent) to reduce NPSP.  Two key
constraints must be satisfied.  First, to guarantee that the agent elects to engage in the principal's enterprise,
the participation constraint states that participation must yield utility at least equal to what the agent
might obtain from some alternative feasible enterprise.  Second, the incentive compatibility constraint
guarantees that the optimizing agent will choose those actions preferred by the principal over alternative
feasible actions.  Applying this theoretical framework to seed corn contracts, Chu et al. determined that the2
     3While reducing fertilizer use can result in “win-win” situations where profitability and environmental
quality are both served, the high value of many contracted commodities -- seed corn in particular -- makes a
“win-win” outcome less likely than it is in the instance of lower-value agronomic commodity production.
incentive payment must depend on crop yield as well as a fixed payment to meet the participation
constraint.  This paper applies that framework to a representative farm case for several different kinds of
contract designs.
In one common class of seed corn contract, the seed conditioning company offers a per-acre




= * + ry (1)
where s denotes total payment from the seed processor to the contractor-grower; y, grower yield of seed
corn per acre; y
o, regional yield per acre; Q, base crop yield; P, the price of commercial corn per bushel; " ",
a coefficient that transforms seed corn yield to commercial corn equivalents; $ $, a price premium
adjustment coefficient.  Because the inbred lines have lower yields than commercial hybrids, the value of " "
is always greater than one.  The transaction costs associated with contract production are compensated
through a price premium adjustment coefficient, $ $, which also is greater than one.  Note that payment s(y)
can be written in a linear form consisting of two parts: a fixed and a variable payment, conditioned on the
observed output level.  Coefficients * * and r become the seed corn conditioning firm's choice variables to
design an incentive payment.
Given the externality of NPSP to profit-motivated agricultural production decisions, NPSP may
exceed socially optimal levels
3 (e.g., Chu et al., 1995).  For purposes of regulation avoidance or public
relations, a processing firm may wish to reduce NPSP on the farms of contracted growers.  A number of
contract designs are capable of achieving this result.  However, these contracts vary in enforceability as
well as economic impacts on principal and agent.  We will examine how several contract designs would
perform at reducing nitrate leaching in Michigan seed corn production.3
a. Restricting Practices within Contracts.   The most direct approach to reduce nitrate leaching is
for the contract to restrict the permissible ambient level of nitrate leaching in groundwater.  However,
nitrate leaching is difficult to monitor.  More easily monitored are restrictions on permissible agronomic
practices, such as amount of nitrogen (N) fertilizer applied, timing of N fertilization, or choice of crop
rotation.
b. Specifying Financial "Punishment" within Contracts.  One alternative to a rigid restriction is a
financial penalty associated with exceeding a specified threshold level of NPSP.  For example, if nitrate
leaching from each field can be measured, a Pigouvian fee can be imposed on the amount exceeding a
certain level, perhaps the safe drinking water standard.  A flat-rate penalty on any field exceeding the
permissible level would be simpler to apply .  Given that N fertilizer use may be easier to observe, a fee on
the rate applied might be less costly to administer.
c. Rearranging the Incentive Payment Schemes.  Nitrate leaching above ambient levels appears to
be directly related to N fertilizer applications that exceed seed corn uptake potential (Ritchie, 1987).  Such
high nitrogen applications can be induced by a high marginal revenue in form of the seed corn contract
variable payment (r).  Since a high variable payment (r in equation (1)) makes the value of marginal product
high in seed corn, growers tend to use high rates of inputs such as nitrogen fertilizer.   If the principal
internalizes the social cost of nitrate leaching into the incentive payment, the resulting variable payment r
a
is less than the payment that would result if that negative externality were ignored (Chu et al., 1995) .
d. Providing Information within Contracts.  The processor-principal could provide information to
contracted growers as a supplement to any contract design.  The principal may be well-positioned to support
applied research on low-cost methods of reducing nitrate NPSP and diffusing the results to grower
contractors.  The information might include some of the required practices mentioned in section a.  Such
information could be delivered through a required grower training program or information packet and
certified through a stewardship test.4
     4Forty-two years of maize yields and nitrate leaching were simulated for common Michigan seed corn
and commercial corn genotypes using 1951-1992 temperature and precipitation data from Three Rivers,
Michigan, and insolation data from Ft. Wayne, Indiana.  The CERES-Maize component of DSSAT 3.0 has
been validated not only for corn yield but also for cumulative nitrate leaching over time (Kovacs, Nemeth, and
Ritchie, 1995).
A representative seed corn grower
One means to evaluate contract performance subject to a participation constraint is to model the
seed corn grower's whole farm.  A variety of potential enterprises are included in a mathematical
programming model in order to capture the opportunity cost of choosing seed corn production over
alternative activities.
We examine a representative contract grower of seed corn in southwestern Michigan, one of three
areas in the state where groundwater is known to have high nitrate concentrations (Kittleson, 1987).  The
irrigated sandy loam soils there have a high potential for nitrate leaching when excess nitrogen fertilizer is
applied.  The crops grown in this area include commercial corn, seed corn, soybeans, potatoes, dry beans,
and wheat (King, 1994).  Due to its high value, seed corn production is one of the most important crops in
this area.  Seed corn contracts are scarce; most growers would like to contract more acreage and many
growers are currently unable to get any contract at all.
The representative cash crop farm owns 1200 irrigated, tillable acres, may rent up to 500
additional irrigated acres, and holds a contract allotment for up to 500 acres of seed corn.  The farm is
operated by one adult operating a typical machinery complement, with the option to hire supplementary
labor.  Crop enterprises include seed corn, commercial corn, soybean, and potato, this last being a cash rent
contract.  Crop rotations with associated nitrogen carryover and yield effects are modeled with coefficients
based on expert opinions and mean values from crop yield and nitrate leaching simulation using DSSAT 3.0
(Tsuji et al., 1994)
4.  Crop enterprises and their price, yield and nitrate leaching coefficients are shown in
Table 1.5
     5Some growers in southwestern Michigan apply up to 180 lb/acre nitrogen on seed corn, well above the
“high” nitrogen scenario of 133.5 lb/ac modeled here.  This behavior implies that other factors may be at work,
e.g., growers fertilize for high yield in case of an exceptionally good weather year, other seed corn inbred lines
are more responsive to nitrogen, growers overrate the yield response to nitrogen, or growers are averse to the
Whole farm LP analysis to compare alternative contract designs
The model assumes the representative grower maximizes expected net returns from cash crop
production and rental activities.  The optimization analysis was conducted using PC-LP (Dobbins et al.,
1994), a whole-farm linear programming software designed to model field time constraints and associated
yield penalties (Apland, 1993).  The whole-farm model is used to examine how nitrate leaching, as well as
gross margins over nitrogen costs, differ between the current contract and alternatives, from both grower
and processor perspectives.
Ten alternative contract designs were examined.  The strategies are labeled according to the
contract types described earlier (Table 2).  They include five restrictions on agronomic practices, of which
three are restrictions on nitrate leaching (a.1.1, a.1.2, a.1.3), one on nitrogen fertilizer applications (a.2),
and one on rotation with potatoes (a.3).  Three designs charge the grower fees, two for excessive nitrate
leaching (b.1.1, b.1.2) and one on “excessive” fertilizer use (b.2).  The last two contract designs reduce the
variable payment for seed corn yield; one increases the fixed payment enough to maintain grower net
returns (c), while the other increases the fixed payment by a lesser amount, only enough to maintain
processor net returns (c’).
Before examining how alternative contract designs performed, the nitrate leaching model
parameters deserve scrutiny.  As it turns out, the seed corn crop, which is susceptible to contract design
manipulation, is not the crop responsible for the most nitrate leaching (Table 1).  Potato causes more
leaching than seed corn, as does commercial corn under many scenarios.  Another factor that limits even
further the nitrate-leaching reduction potential of seed corn contracts is the fact that the high seed corn
fertilization strategy is not profitable, given the current nitrogen fertilizer price (18¢/lb), the $5.28/bu
variable payment rate for seed corn, and the modest seed corn yield gained from moving to the high
nitrogen fertilizer rate
5.  Hence, it does not even enter the solution in the unrestricted base model (Table 3).6
risk of low yields that could put their contract in jeopardy in future.
The relatively low leaching propensity of seed corn with medium to low nitrogen levels suggests
that contract designs that focus strictly on seed corn will have little effect on whole-farm nitrate leaching. 
The optimization analysis bears this out (Table 3).  The strategies that clearly reduce leaching are all ones
that either a) target the entire farm (a.1.1) or b) change the crop rotation directly (a.3) or indirectly by
targeting average leaching from the rotation (a.1.2, a.1.3, b.1.1, b.1.2), not those that focus strictly on seed
corn.
Increased financial returns represent the other objective of the contract parties, apart from reduced
nitrate leaching.  These returns are represented in Table 4 as the whole-farm gross margin (GM) over
variable costs.  For the contract grower, they represent the maximum GM solution to the LP problem.  For
the seed corn processor, GM represents the value of seed corn yield (assumed to be $50/bu) minus
payments made to growers plus revenues from fees charged to growers (e.g., for excessive nitrate leaching
or nitrogen fertilizer application).  One efficiency criterion for evaluation of the alternative contract
designs is dominance analysis of mean nitrate leaching (lower levels preferred) versus mean gross margins
(higher levels preferred).  By this definition of dominance, strategy A dominates strategy B if and only if
either (NLA < NLB and GMA $ GMB) or (NLA #NLB and GMA > GMB).
By this definition of leaching-gross margin dominance, the efficient strategies that are not
dominated from the processor’s (principal’s) perspective are a.1.1, a.1.3, a.3, b.1.1, b.1.2, and c’.  If we
consider the case where a grower might be willing to reduce gross margin if leaching could be reduced
efficiently, then the efficient strategies for leaching reduction from the grower’s perspective are a.1.2,
a.1.3, a.3, b.1.2 , and c.  Interestingly, there are three strategies that fall into the efficient set for both
parties: field-level restriction of leaching (a.1.3), restriction on rotation with potatoes (a.3), and a $5/lb fee
for excessive nitrate leaching (b.1.2).
To evaluate these strategies on the basis of aggregate efficiency, however, misses the cost of
reaching the environmental quality objective of reduced leaching.  One way to capture this cost is to7
measure the reduction in gross margin per pound reduction in nitrate leaching, as shown in the last two
columns of Table 4.  The “GM and “NL figures are calculated as the difference between the base model
levels and those in each alternative scenario.  The “GM/“NL ratios can also be evaluated by dominance
analysis.  In this instance, strategy A dominates strategy B if it reduces leaching at lower cost for the
grower without increasing costs for the processor or vice-versa.  Algebraically, strategy A dominates
strategy B iff. [(“GM/“NL)A
P
  $ (“GM/“NL)B
P and (“GM/“NL)A
G  > (“GM/“NL)B





G].  This efficiency criterion eliminates only four inefficient
contract designs, a.2, b.2, b.1.2, and c’ (Figure 1), if linear combinations of contract designs are
disallowed.  However, it does rule out the $5/lb fee on excessive leaching as too costly, even though this
contract design achieves the lowest nitrate leaching in seed corn.  The two contract designs that are
efficient by both the whole-farm and the cost-per-pound-of-leachate criteria are the restriction on potato
rotation (a.3) and the field-level restriction on nitrate leaching (a.1.3).
Central to the principal-agent problem is the transaction cost of monitoring enforcement or
otherwise insuring incentive compatibility.  Whether contract enforcement is cost-effective determines
whether the contract is feasible.  Of the contract designs reviewed here, those based on nitrate leaching can
only be monitored at prohibitive cost unless by simulation.  To date, the legal system has not accepted
computer simulations as sufficient grounds for regulatory enforcement; there is no reason to suspect that
agricultural processing businesses would feel otherwise about contract enforcement with input suppliers. 
Enforceability concerns eliminate the three a.1 strategies and both b.1 strategies.  Similarly, the cost of
monitoring the level of nitrogen fertilizer application is likely also to be high, despite the fact that methods
for monitoring have been proposed (e.g., nitrate concentration in cornstalks at maturity (Binford, Blackmer
and Messe, 1992; Binford, Blackmer and El-Hout, 1990)).  This cost would eliminate strategies a.2 and b.2. 
Thus, on the basis of contract enforceability, only the restriction on rotation with potatoes and the
revised variable payment contract are acceptable.   The former is an easily observed crop rotation with low
enforcement cost.  The changed incentive payment in the latter meets the principal-agent incentive8
     6To be successful over the long term, a reduced variable payment contract would also have to decouple
annual yields from contract retention, or else growers might still fertilize heavily out of risk aversion.
compatibility constraint, giving the contract grower an incentive to reduce nitrogen fertilizer rates without
monitoring.  As shown by contract designs c and c’, the incidence of who bears the costs of leaching
reduction in a linear payment scheme of this kind can be adjusted simply by changing the fixed payment.
6 
Many other possible contract designs have not been reviewed here.  These include permutations of the two
enforceable strategy types, as well as various educational strategies which were not examined at all.
Conclusions
This case study of seed corn contract redesign to obtain reduced nitrate leaching demonstrates that
such redesigns are possible.  But they vary greatly in the magnitude and incidence of their opportunity costs
and enforcement costs.   If the processor-principal is motived to reduce nitrate leaching for whatever
reason and expects the contracted grower to bear the attendant costs, the prevention of “cheating” is quite
important.  If enforcement mechanisms are available, low-cost, and effective, the range of feasible
alternative contracts expands.  Thus, the development of techniques than can easily be applied to measure
compliance is an important research priority.
Two methodological issues also need further research.  The first issue is how to incorporate
imperfect, asymmetrically-held information on probability distributions over crop yield and NL potential. 
Risk programming approaches might be suitable here.  The second, more ambitious challenge, is to model
explicitly the two-level programming problem imbedding the contract grower’s objective function in that of
the processor principal.9



























Continuous corn; 222.5 lbs/acre N
Continuous corn; 187 lbs/acre N
Continuous corn; 160 lbs/acre N
Corn after soybean; 196 lbs/acre N
Corn after soybean; 160 lbs/acre N
Corn after soybean; 133.5 lbs/acre N
Corn after potato; 222.5 lbs/acre N 
Corn after potato; 187 lbs/acre N
Corn after potato; 160 lbs/acre N
























Cont. seed corn; 133.5 lbs/acre N
Cont. seed corn; 107 lbs/acre N 
Cont. seed corn; 80 lbs/acre N
Seed corn after soy; 107 lbs/acre N
Seed corn after soy; 80 lbs/acre N
Seed corn after soy; 53.5 lbs/acre N
Seed corn after potato; 133.5 lbs/acre N
Seed corn after potato; 107 lbs/acre N
Seed corn after potato; 80 lbs/acre N
Soybean $5.70 Bean 35.5 45 Soybean after corn or seed corn; no N
Potato   $225/ac Potato NA 146 Potato after corn or seed corn; 248 lb/acre N
1Commodity prices and input levels from Nott et al. (1995), Schweikhardt et al. (1995), and King
(1994).10
Table 2: Alternative contract designs
a.1.1  Restrict nitrate leaching (NL) to 60 lb/acre for whole farm
a.1.2  Restrict NL to 60 lbs/acre average for all seed corn
a.1.3  Restrict NL to 60 lbs/acre on each seed corn field
a.2  Restrict nitrogen (N) fertilizer applied to 80 lb N/acre in seed corn
a.3  Restrict seed corn/potato rotation (due to high nitrate leaching from potato)
b.1.1  Charge grower $4/lb nitrate-N for leaching above 50 lb/acre in seed corn
b.1.2  Charge grower $5/lb nitrate-N for leaching above 50 lb/acre in seed corn
b.2  Charge grower $0.34/lb over cost for nitrogen fertilizer above 80 lb N/ac on seed corn 
c. Adjust incentive payment to $330/acre fixed payment plus $1.90/bu variable payment
c’.  Adjust incentive payment to $200/acre fixed payment plus $1.90/bu variable payment11
Table 3: Optimal solutions for representative grower under different contract designs
Strategy 
Mean seed corn yield
(bu/acre)
Mean nitrate
leaching  (lbs/acre) Enterprises (acres)








60lb/acre  (all acres)
-------------------------------
--
a.1.2 Restrict NL to




a.1.3  Restrict NL to






































a.2 Restrict N fert. to
80 lb/acre (avg. seed field)
73.7 109 (all)
67 (seed)




74.4 same as a.1.3 same as a.1.3


























b.2 Charge 34¢/lb. on 
N fert. > 80 lb./ac.
73.7 109 (all)
67 (seed)
same as base except
PSeed(L)(500)
c. & c’.  Seed corn
contracts:




same as base except
PSeed(L)(500)13
















Basic model 69 1,672,404 342,443
a.1.1 Restrict NL to 60lb/ac (all) 58 1,645,140 290,726 4.95 9.40
a.1.2 Restrict NL to 60lb/ac (seed) 60 1,599,695 322,936 16.16 4.33
a.1.3 Res. NL 60lb/ac (ea. seed field) 54 1,628,053 307,149 5.91 4.71
a.2   Maximum of 80 lb N/ac. 67 1,612,032 337,880 60.37 4.56
a.3   No rotation with potato 54 1,628,053 307,149 5.91 4.71
b.1.1 Charge $4/lb on NL> 50 lb/ac) 66 1,675,685 304,517 -2.18 25.28
b.1.2 Charge $5/lb on NL>50 lb/ac) 52 1,615,151 299,214 6.74 5.09
b.2   Charge 34¢/lb for >80 lb N/ac 67 1,612,032 337,880 60.37 4.56
c.    Seed corn @ $330/ac + $1.90/bu 67 1,607,485 342,427 64.92 0.02
c’.   Seed corn @ $200/ac + $1.90/bu 67 1,672,485 277,427 -0.08 65.02
1GM of the principal is calculated as: [$50/bu - variable payment ($/bu) to grower) * yield per acre *
acres per grower] - [fixed payment ($/acre) * acres per grower]
2GM of the grower represents the net return to grower resources.
3Figures are calculated with respect to the base model GM and NL levels.14
Figure 1: Dominance analysis of principal’s and agent’s cost per pound of leaching reduction.15
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